Work in Progress
Actualism, Modal Reductionism, and Contingentism
A certain kind of modal reductionism is in seeming tension with the conjunction of contingentism (the view that it's contingent which individuals exist) and S5-ism (the view that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic of S5). The tension between these views rests on a particularly strong reductionist commitment: The modal truths of any world are determined entirely by individuals of that world. The tension is this: If the modal truths of some world are determined by what there is in that world (as this kind of reductionist says), and if it's contingent what there is (as the contingentist says), then the modal truths could have been different. But S5-ism says that the modal truths couldn't have been different. This tension is quite general, seemingly affecting a wide variety of reductionist views. But there's a general solution that's antecedently motivated by a recent strand of actualist-friendly reductionism: Modal truths are determined by what there actually is. What would be necessary or possible had there existed different individuals are just more modal truths. They, too, are determined by what there actually is.
(Title redacted)
Higher-order contingentists are sometimes told that their view is self-defeating. They want to account for the possibility that incompossibles be indiscernible. But, in presenting it as literally true that, possibly, incompossibles are indiscernible, the higher-order contingentist denies the being constraint, roughly the constraint that, necessarily, only existing individuals are propertied. Is it really true that, possibly, incompossibles are indiscernible, despite their failure to possibly coexist? If not, the higher-order contingentist fails to take how she states her own view seriously. The higher-order contingentist must rescue enough legitimacy for sentences like, "There could have been incompossible indiscernibles'' in order to avoid self-defeat. But rescue too much legitimacy (i.e., literal truth), and she denies the being constraint. This paper follows others in looking for a middle ground: "accounting for'' discourse needn't require consenting to its literal truth.
Tolerating Arbitrariness
Concerns over arbitrariness are taken seriously in metaphysics. If snowballs (lumps of snow that are essentially spherical) exist, do snowdiscalls (lumps of snow that are essentially disc-shaped) also exist? If snowballs, but not snowdiscalls, existed, that would be arbitrary. Or, if statues exist, do coincident lumps of clay also exist? If statues, but not coincident lumps, existed, that would be arbitrary. On pains of arbitrariness, either both exist or neither do. Arbitrariness concerns often motivate revisionary ontologies (either quite large or quite small), the motivating idea being that we need to either proliferate or decrease the number of things in order to avoid arbitrary distinctions. We ought to avoid arbitrary distinctions, the thought goes, because they're intolerably weird. And metaphysics has no place for weirdness. This general case against arbitrariness is overstated; sometimes, we ought to tolerate arbitrary distinctions in our metaphysical theories. And discerning when an arbitrary distinction is tolerable requires a better understanding of just what makes a distinction arbitrary. So, this paper offers an account of arbitrariness with the aim of explaining why metaphysicians have been too hasty in turning their backs on arbitrariness.
A certain kind of modal reductionism is in seeming tension with the conjunction of contingentism (the view that it's contingent which individuals exist) and S5-ism (the view that metaphysical modality obeys the modal logic of S5). The tension between these views rests on a particularly strong reductionist commitment: The modal truths of any world are determined entirely by individuals of that world. The tension is this: If the modal truths of some world are determined by what there is in that world (as this kind of reductionist says), and if it's contingent what there is (as the contingentist says), then the modal truths could have been different. But S5-ism says that the modal truths couldn't have been different. This tension is quite general, seemingly affecting a wide variety of reductionist views. But there's a general solution that's antecedently motivated by a recent strand of actualist-friendly reductionism: Modal truths are determined by what there actually is. What would be necessary or possible had there existed different individuals are just more modal truths. They, too, are determined by what there actually is.
(Title redacted)
Higher-order contingentists are sometimes told that their view is self-defeating. They want to account for the possibility that incompossibles be indiscernible. But, in presenting it as literally true that, possibly, incompossibles are indiscernible, the higher-order contingentist denies the being constraint, roughly the constraint that, necessarily, only existing individuals are propertied. Is it really true that, possibly, incompossibles are indiscernible, despite their failure to possibly coexist? If not, the higher-order contingentist fails to take how she states her own view seriously. The higher-order contingentist must rescue enough legitimacy for sentences like, "There could have been incompossible indiscernibles'' in order to avoid self-defeat. But rescue too much legitimacy (i.e., literal truth), and she denies the being constraint. This paper follows others in looking for a middle ground: "accounting for'' discourse needn't require consenting to its literal truth.
Tolerating Arbitrariness
Concerns over arbitrariness are taken seriously in metaphysics. If snowballs (lumps of snow that are essentially spherical) exist, do snowdiscalls (lumps of snow that are essentially disc-shaped) also exist? If snowballs, but not snowdiscalls, existed, that would be arbitrary. Or, if statues exist, do coincident lumps of clay also exist? If statues, but not coincident lumps, existed, that would be arbitrary. On pains of arbitrariness, either both exist or neither do. Arbitrariness concerns often motivate revisionary ontologies (either quite large or quite small), the motivating idea being that we need to either proliferate or decrease the number of things in order to avoid arbitrary distinctions. We ought to avoid arbitrary distinctions, the thought goes, because they're intolerably weird. And metaphysics has no place for weirdness. This general case against arbitrariness is overstated; sometimes, we ought to tolerate arbitrary distinctions in our metaphysical theories. And discerning when an arbitrary distinction is tolerable requires a better understanding of just what makes a distinction arbitrary. So, this paper offers an account of arbitrariness with the aim of explaining why metaphysicians have been too hasty in turning their backs on arbitrariness.